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armers who do not want to plant genetically 
modified crops in the United States have two seri-
ous problems. First, windblown genetically modified 
pollen from the fields of neighboring farmers often 
contaminates their fields. 
For example, a genetically modified corn variety named “StarLink” 
was planted in approximately one percent of cornfields in Iowa in 
1998. By the year 2000, more than half of the fields in that state 
showed some signs of genetic contamination. 
Because this variety was only approved by the FDA for animal 
consumption, products meant for humans containing the StarLink 
genetic material had to be recalled. Two biotech companies eventu-
ally settled one of the related StarLink suits for more than $110 
million.
Neither of the authors of this article are organic food nuts but, as 
commercial lawyers, we are concerned by the situation facing farm-
ers in the United States who want to grow non-genetically modified 
(non-GMO) crops for buyers in jurisdictions that heavily regulate 
or forbid the sale of genetically modified food products, like the 
European Union or Japan, or who sell to purveyors of organic food 
products in the United States or elsewhere. 
The market for non-GMO crops overseas is enormous, but it is 
very substantial in the United States as well. Most supermarkets have 
an organic section now, and major suppliers such as Gerber baby 
food and Frito-Lay corn chips buy only non-GMO raw materials. 
Not surprisingly, non-GMO food stuffs often command a pre-
mium price. Recent studies show grocery store premiums for organic 
vegetables are 120 percent higher and Japanese students are willing 
to pay at least 33 percent more for organic soybean oil. Additionally, 
one recent check of the commodities market showed non-GMO 
corn selling for $4 per bushel while GMO corn sold for $1.67 per 
bushel.
Non-GMO farmers, however, run the constant risk of their crops 
being contaminated by pollen from patented genetically modified 
plants. If a farmer has a forward contract for non-GMO corn for 
sale in Europe, and her corn fields are pollinated by a neighbor’s 
genetically modified crop, then the farmer will have to breach her 
contract with the European buyer and possibly have to pay damages. 
At best, the anticipated premium from selling the non-GMO crop 
will be lost. 
More importantly, the non-GMO farmer may find herself unable 
to sell the contaminated crop at all, because if her plants are found to 
contain patented cell structures claimed by the patentee of the GMO 
corn, then the farmer is arguably a patent infringer and selling her 
crop without the patentee’s permission will be fraught with risk.
This is the second problem that concerns us – the possibility that 
a patent on a GMO seed or pollen can be used to render bystanding 
non-GMO farmers liable for patent infringement when their crops 
are contaminated. 
Although the factual problem of contamination through pollen 
drift is very real for non-GMO farmers, the danger posed by patent 
law seems far-fetched to some, given that in most areas of the law 
innocent bystanders have a complete defense. 
Patent Law Liability
Patent law, however, is based on the 
concept of strict liability. If a department store 
sells an infringing product, for example, the 
store is liable whether it knew the product was 
infringing or not. A scientist working in her 
lab is guilty of patent infringement even if she 
has no idea the new compound she has just 
synthesized happens to read on the claims of 
an existing patent. 
Although the Canadian Supreme Court 
ducked the innocence issue in the famous 
Monsanto	Canada	Inc.	v.	Schmeiser case1, 
the court did find that a bystanding 
farmer could be liable for patent infringe-
ment stemming from windblown GMO 
pollen. 
Monsanto, the world’s leading agri-
cultural biotech corporation, providing 
over 90 percent of the technology for 
the world’s GMO crops, has been par-
ticularly active in using patent law to 
police anyone it finds to be growing its 
patented plants. 
In fact, Monsanto’s lead in its indus-
try is certainly due in part to its use 
of forceful investigations and prosecu-
tions against those it suspects of pat-
ent infringement, regardless of whether 
such infringers are willful or are even 
aware of their alleged infringement. 
In short, Monsanto is in the unique 
position of being able to take a problem 
that it created – the contamination of non-
GMO plants by pollen drift from GMO plants – and use 
it to its advantage by prosecuting those bystanding farmers whose 
crops become contaminated. 
Monsanto devotes a large amount of its resources to pursuing 
patent infringers – the company has 75 full-time employees and $10 
million per year devoted to the prosecutions and investigations. 
It is believed that actions and investigations by Monsanto against 
farmers number into the thousands, with most settling outside of 
court in confidential agreements. Generally, the company initiates 
between 500 and 600 new investigations each year, many of which 
are the result of tips called in to the company’s toll-free hotline. 
There have been approximately 90 actual lawsuits filed by 
Monsanto involving 147 farmers and 39 farm companies in 25 
different states. While Monsanto has taken the lead in plant patent 
litigation, farmers can be sure that other biotech companies will soon 
follow suit.
It is helpful to consider an actual Monsanto patent. U.S. Patent 
No. 6,114,610 “relates to the seeds of inbred corn line ASG27, to 
the plants of inbred corn line ASG27 and to methods for producing 
a corn plant produced by crossing the inbred line ASG27 with itself 
or another corn line [and] to hybrid corn seeds and plants produced 
by crossing the inbred line ASG27 with another corn line.” 




hybrid seeds, the patent covers the pollen of the plant, the method 
for cross-breeding a hybrid and various gene conversions of the 
patented plant.
Given the broad scope of Monsanto’s claims, it is relatively easy to 
see how a bystanding farmer might unwittingly violate the patentee’s 
exclusive statutory rights to use, make and sell the patented inven-
tion. 
If the wind blows the patented pollen onto a bystanding farmer’s 
corn plants and those plants are pollinated, then the farmer has argu-
ably used the pollen in violation of the Monsanto patent. 
The pollinated plants would then produce hybrid seeds in poten-
tial violation of Monsanto’s method patent for hybridization and its 
product patent for hybrid seeds. 
If the plants are harvested and the hybrid seed sold, a further 
violation of Monsanto’s right to sell the 
patented seeds may occur. 
And, finally, if hybrid seeds are saved 
and replanted, a further infringing use 
could be alleged.
We propose two legal solutions to the 
plight of the bystanding farmer. The first is 
defensive: Identifying possible defenses to 
patent infringement under federal law. The 
second is offensive: Identifying possible 
causes of action against genetic polluters 
under state law.
Defensive Legal  
Solutions
The most promising defenses for 
the bystanding farmer are the doctrine 
of unclean hands, patent misuse and the 
ancient defense of volenti	non	fit	injuria. 
The unclean hands doctrine provides 
a defense when the alleged victim of the 
infringement (here the patentee) also 
took part in the wrongdoing (allowing 
the unwanted spread of patented genetic 
material). 
As Judge Richard A. Posner of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
asserted in Smithkline	 Beechum	 Corp.	 v.	
Apotex	Corp.: “I believe that as a matter of fundamental principle it 
must be an equitable defense to a charge of patent infringement that 
the patentee caused the infringement.”2 
Since the alleged wrong committed by the bystanding farmer is 
directly traceable to the patentee’s actions, the unclean hands defense 
may be available. 
The patent misuse defense punishes patentees who try to extend 
their patent beyond its lawful scope. Take, for example, the patent on 
“Round-Up Ready” seeds. This invention allows the farmer to plant 
seeds and then spray the herbicide Round-Up on the growing plants 
to kill weeds without harming the young crops. 
One can argue that the subject of the monopoly inherent in the 
patent grant on Round-Up Ready seed products is farmers who want 
to spray Round-Up on their crops. 
An organic farmer who uses no herbicides is not in the market for 
such seeds. It may be an act of patent misuse to attempt to extend the 
patent monopoly by suing a farmer whose organic fields have been 
contaminated with Round-Up Ready pollen.
Lastly, the ancient equitable defense of volenti	 non	 fit	 injuria, 
roughly translated as “he who suffers damage through his own fault 
has no right to complain of it,”3 could potentially be invoked. The 
doctrine denies relief to those responsible for harming their own 
interests. 
In the case of pollen drift, a strong argument can be made that 
the patented genetic material has literally been cast to the winds by 
the patentee and its licensed distributors. 
Would it not be inequitable for them to claim to be damaged 
by the fully anticipated natural distribution of their patented inven-
tion? 
This defense has not yet been applied in a patent infringement 
suit, but the unique facts of the pollen 




State tort law is likely to grant signifi-
cant protection to bystanding farmers who 
suffer harm when their crops are pollinated 
from GMO crops. 
The action for private nuisance provides 
the most fertile ground for analysis, along 
with strict liability, which in this context 
may be viewed as a species of nuisance or as 
a freestanding tort. 
Other tort theories having some plau-
sibility consist of trespass to land, public 
nuisance, negligence and interference with 
personal property (trespass to goods or 
conversion). 
Nuisance is often said to be a relative 
concept. It balances the gravity of the injury 
to the plaintiff against the utility of the 
defendant’s conduct to arrive at a judgment 
as to whether a nuisance has taken place. 
The defendant’s conduct is found to be 
a nuisance if it is said to be unreasonable, 
considering all the facts and circumstances, 
including the plaintiff ’s position. 
Nuisance, however, has two other zones, lying on opposite sides 
of the balancing core. Both of these zones give us bright-line rules. 
The first zone is what we might call nuisance	immunity. Certain 
landowner activities are regarded as sufficiently beneficial or benign 
that courts virtually never castigate them as nuisances. 
Second, there is the nuisance per	 se doctrine. Certain conduct, 
perceived as generally undesirable or high risk, is always wrongful. 
Nuisance per	 se is properly seen as a species of strict liability, even 
though many courts choose not to discuss it in those terms.
Nuisance immunity shelters different types of landowner activi-
ties, including putting up a building that blocks a neighbor’s view or 
access to air and light or that is ugly, causing “aesthetic harm.” 
A line of old noxious weed cases approaches our problem of 
GMO pollen drift. These cases immunized owners of weed-infested 











“polluted” nearby crops. In a representative case, Harndon	v.	Stultz, 
an Iowa court held that a farmer whose lands were “greatly damaged” 
by a cocklebur infestation had no cause of action.4
At first blush, the noxious plant cases might support immunizing 
the GMO crop defendants from liability. Both fact patterns involve 
an invasion by reproductive parts of plants: seeds and pollen. 
There are, however, two critical distinctions. First, most courts 
that have excused the weed grower emphasized that the plants grew 
naturally or accidentally on the defendant’s land. The defendant did 
not purposely plant them. With respect to the bystanding farmer, the 
prototypical defendant has intentionally planted the GMO crops.
Second, in the noxious plant cases, as in standard pollution cases, 
the defendant polluter does not assert an ownership interest in the 
emitted material. The polluter owned the substances prior to their 
escape, but abandoned them when they left the polluter’s land. 
Standard pollutants like weed seeds and pollen, leaves, dirt or 
smoke have no value, but if a victim of pollution can “harvest the 
pollution,” she is free to keep the substance. 
Suppose a landowner’s operations propitiously emit gold dust 
through the air or water, a neighbor who captures the dust will own 
it. 
Conversely, retained ownership of a thing that enters a neighbor’s 
tract generally makes the owner liable for damages. This is why own-
ers of domesticated animals are usually strictly liable when they stray 
and why, in contrast, landowners are not liable if unconstrained wild 
animals exit their land and damage a neighbor’s land. 
In the GMO pollination situation, the defendant who holds a 
valid patent is like the owner of straying domestic animals.
In nuisance’s large middle zone, courts and fact finders balance a 
number of factors to determine which party has a property entitle-
ment. 
In the 19th century, American courts departed from a view 
of nuisance that held a defendant liable for all substantial harms 
caused by its invasions. With the rise of industrialization, judges 
became reluctant to assess damages against emerging commercial 
enterprises. 
The modern approach is reflected by the Restatement of Torts 
(Second), which calls for an evaluation of a total of eight factors 
bearing on the gravity of the plaintiff ’s harm and the utility of the 
defendant’s conduct. 
The restatement approach may have the virtue of being flexible 
and adaptable, but it does not compel any particular result in any 
imaginable nuisance dispute. 
Such legal indeterminacy has one highly important consequence 
for GMO nuisance litigation. In almost every case of alleged GMO 
pollen damage, fact finding will be necessary. Cases will survive 
motions for summary judgment and proceed to the jury (or to the 
court as fact finder if there is no jury).
Martin	Chair	Jim	Smith	(left)	discusses	some	legal	issues	regarding	the	growth	of	genetically	modified	crops	with	Post	Professor	Paul	Heald.	Photo	by	Terry	Allen.
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Bystanding farmers are likely to assert strict liability claims against 
GMO defendants. 
Under modern tort law, the issue turns on whether the produc-
tion and use of GMO goods would constitute an “inherently danger-
ous” or “ultra hazardous” activity. 
Pesticide drift cases provide an analogy. Two of the leading cases, 
one from Washington and the other from Wisconsin, reached oppo-
site conclusions. 
In the Washington case, Langan	v.	Valicopters5, pesticides applied 
by helicopter drifted across a farm boundary, falling on the plaintiff ’s 
organic crops. The plaintiff recovered damages for the market value 
of the crops based on strict liability. The court emphasized that pes-
ticide drift is unpredictable, cannot be fully controlled by the exer-
cise of reasonable care and will cause significant harm if it contacts 
organic crops. 
In the Wisconsin case, Bennett	 v.	 Larsen	 Co.6, a corn farmer 
sprayed his fields with pesticides to combat corn borers and ear-
worms. The plaintiffs were beekeepers, with some of their hives 
located near the cornfields. The pesticide labels indicated that the 
product might kill honeybees in substantial numbers. This hap-
pened, but the court rejected strict liability, requiring that the bee-
keepers prove negligence.
Those jurisdictions that impose strict liability on pesticide 
applicators, like Washington, would be more likely to hold GMO 
producers strictly liable than those jurisdictions, like Wisconsin, that 
refuse to do so. 
One explanation for the divergence between Washington and 
Wisconsin lies in the way they view the consideration of the “com-
mon usage” factor – an activity is not “abnormally dangerous” so as 
to give rise to strict liability if it is “a matter of common usage.”7 
The Wisconsin court asked whether applying pesticides is a 
common practice among agriculturalists in the community, but the 
Washington court asked whether crop dusting is a common practice 
among the general population in the community (like driving a car). 
Such jurisdictions might also diverge in their views of whether GMO 
farming constitutes a common practice.
Conclusion
We conclude that bystanding farmers ought to fare well in 
litigation with GMO patent holders and persons engaged in GMO 
agriculture. The ultimate goal of patent law is diversity. 
As consumers, we hope to have more products to choose from 
because of the incentives that patent law provides. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that patent law provides an impres-
sive laundry list of defenses available to farmers who are the victims 
of unwanted pollen drift. 
The common law here works hand-in-hand with patent law to 
ensure that a farmer’s choices are respected. 
Strong arguments can be made that positive economic relief 
should be afforded to farmers who can show the value of their crop 
has been diminished due to pollen drift. 
GMO pollen drift is a new, high-tech problem, but well-estab-
lished principles of federal and state law appear prepared to offer 
viable low-tech solutions.
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